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RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR BAR ADMISSION STRUCK DOWN AS
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
OF ARTICLE IV OF THE CONSTITUTION
Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.
1983) (en banc)
In Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit2 cautiously confirmed the pre-
vailing application 3 of the privileges and immunities clause4 to the le-
gal profession by declaring unconstitutional the New Hampshire Bar
residency requirement, which excluded qualified attorneys from prac-
ticing within the state solely on the basis of nonresidency.5
1. 723 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc),prob.juris noted, 104 S. Ct. 2146 (1984).
2. The First Circuit has heard Piper on two separate occasions. In the first proceeding, a
divided three-member panel found that the New Hampshire rule requiring bar applicants to be
New Hampshire residents did not violate the privileges and immunities clause. 723 F.2d 98, 99-
106 (1st Cir.), vacated, 723 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc),prob.juris noted, 104 S. Ct. 2149
(1984). Upon en banc reconsideration, the four-member court divided equally, thereby affirming
the district court decision that the New Hampshire residency requirement violated the privileges
and immunities clause. 723 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc),prob. juris noted, 104 S. Ct. 2149
(1984). See infra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
3. Prior to the First Circuit's determination in Piper, five other courts had determined that
state bar residency requirements violated the privileges and immunities clause. See Stalland v.
South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982); Strauss v. Alabama State
Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Noll v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 649 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980);
Gordon v. Commission on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d
641 (1979); Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1982). Only
one case since 1979 has held that state bar residency requirements do not violate the privileges and
immunities clause. See Canfield v. Wisconsin Bd. of Attorneys Professional Competence, 490 F.
Supp. 1286 (W.D. Wis. 1980), vacated 645 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1981) (Canfield was decided prior to
the Supreme Court's refinement of the equal privileges standard in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S.
518 (1978), and therefore Canfieldis a dubious precedent).
4. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. That clause provides as follows: "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Article
IV should not be confused with the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,
which states in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The article IV provision deals with discrimination as to rights recognized by state law. The four-
teenth amendment provision addresses deprivation of rights that derive from national citizenship.
For a discussion on the privileges or immunities clause, see Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause.- "Its Hour Come Round at Lart"Z 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405.
5. 723 F.2d at 118. Most states have either simple or durational residency requirements. In
a simple residency requirement state, an applicant either must indicate a bona fide intent to estab-
lish residency or actually establish residency at the time of application or admission. See, e.g.,
Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982). A durational resi-
dency requirement specifies that an applicant reside in a state for a fixed period of time prior to a
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The plaintiff, Kathryn Piper, a resident of Vermont,6 sought admis-
sion to the New Hampshire Bar.7 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
denied the plaintiff admission to the Bar' solely on the basis of her
nonresidency.9 The plaintiff subsequently sought an injunction
specified event. See, e.g., Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397
N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979). Seegeneraly NATIONAL BAR EXAMINATION DIoEST 3-35
(D. Skibbe ed. 1980).
6. The plaintiff lives in Lower Waterford, Vermont, less than 400 yards from the New
Hampshire border. The plaintiff decided to practice in New Hampshire "due to the innumerable
conflict of interest problems that would arise should [she] enter the private practice of law in the
same town as [her] husband." Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064,
1065 (D.N.H. 1982), aft'd, 723 F.2d 110 (Ist Cir. 1983). After the plaintiff signed a statement of
intent to become a resident of New Hampshire, personal circumstances arose that prevented the
Pipers from moving. Id
7. In P#ier, the plaintiff faced a simple residency requirement. New Hampshire Supreme
Court Rule 42 states, in part: "Any person domiciled in the United States and who either is a
resident of the State of New Hampshire or filed a statement of intention to reside in the State of
New Hampshire shall be eligible to apply for examination provided he is possessed of qualifica-
tions hereinafter provided." See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §21:6 (Supp. 1983) (A resident of New
Hampshire is one who is domiciled in the state and who has demonstrated an intent to remain in
the state for the indefinite future).
8. 539 F. Supp. at 1065. The plaintiff was actually denied admission to the bar on two
separate occasions. She initially filed a request for an exception to the residency requirement,
which the New Hampshire Supreme court denied. Id The plaintiff then filed a formal petition
with the state supreme court, seeking an exemption from the residency requirement, which the
court also denied. Id
9. Id The New Hampshire Board of Bar Examiners found that the plaintiff possessed good
moral character and suitable qualifications to take the bar exam. Id The plaintiff subsequently
passed the New Hampshire exam. Id
New Hampshire denies an otherwise fit applicant admission to the bar if he or she is not a
resident of New Hampshire at the time of admission. See supra note 7. Seven other states have a
similar system: Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah. Six other states per-
mit simple residency requirements or a caveat: Delaware (simple residency requirement or princi-
pal office), Kentucky (simple residency requirement or perform major portion of practice in
Kentucky or graduate from approved law school in Kentucky), Minnesota (simple residency re-
quirement or maintain an office or designate the Clerk as agent for service of process), Missouri
(simple residency requirement or be resident of adjoining county in adjacent state with intent to
maintain office and practice full-time in Missouri), New Jersey (simple residency requirement or
bona fide office in the state), South Dakota (must be a resident or maintain an office in South
Dakota or designate the Clerk as agent for service of process). Eleven states require a specific
period of residence before examination or admission: Arkansas (60 days), Hawaii (3 months),
Kansas (90 days), Montana (6 months), Nevada (4 months, 28 days), New Mexico (90 days),
North Carolina (37-40 days), Rhode Island (3 months), South Carolina (84-117 days), Tennessee
(2 months), Virginia (71-76 days), Wyoming (6 months). The remaining twenty-five states have
no bar admission residency requirements: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin. The District of Columbia also has no bar residency requirement. D.
SKIBBE, BAR/BRI DIGEST 6-41 (1984 ed.).
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preventing the New Hampshire Supreme Court from enforcing the
residency requirement."0 Piper alleged that the residency requirement
deprived her of the privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed
in article IV of the Constitution."
The district court, applying the analysis set forth in Hicklin v.
Orbeck,' 2 found that the New Hampshire residency requirement vio-
lated the privileges and immunities clause.' 3 On appeal, a panel of the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed.' 4 The First Circuit
then granted a petition for rehearing en banc, vacated the panel's judg-
ment, affirmed the decision of the district court by an equally divided
vote'5 and held: the New Hampshire rule requiring bar applicants to
establish residency in that state violates the privileges and immunities
clause. 16
The principles of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution are virtu-
ally identical to those embodied in the privileges and immunities clause
of the Articles of Confederation. 7 Relying upon the explicit rationale
10. 539 F. Supp. at 1065.
11. Id The plaintiff also alleged that the residency requirement burdened interstate com-
merce and violated the equal protection clause. In addition, the plaintiff fied a pendant state
claim, alleging that Rule 42 violated N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311:2 (1981), which requires that a
member of the New Hampshire bar must be at least 21 years old and must possess good moral
character. Neither the district court nor the First Circuit pursued any of these claims.
12. 437 U.S. 518 (1978). See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
13. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982).
14. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 98 (Ist Cir. 1983). See supra note 2
(In the first Piper decision the majority reasoned that lawyers were not analogous to the oil worker
in Hicklin and therefore did not apply a strict Hicklin privilege or immunities test).
15. See supra note 2.
16. 723 F.2d 110, 118 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc),prob. Juris. noted, 104 S. Ct. 2149 (1984).
17. The privileges and immunities clause of the Articles of Confederation stated in part:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people
of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States. . . shall
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the
people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and
shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof ....
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, cl 1. See generally Special Project, Admission to the Bar:
A Constitutional Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REv. 655, 765 (1981); Note, A Constitutional Analysis of
State Bar Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle
IV, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1461, 1470-71 (1979).
In a pamphlet published contemporaneously with the framing of the Constitution, Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina, the author of the new privileges clause, proclaimed that"[t]he fourth
article [of the Constitution] ... is formed exactly upon the principles of the fourth article of the
present Confederation." 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 112 (M. Farrand rev.
ad. 1966). In 1898, Justice Harlan used language identical to that found in the preamble to article
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of article IV of the Articles of Confederation, courts interpret the privi-
leges and immunities clause in article IV 8 of the Constitution as a
means to facilitate national unification and an open economy by
preventing states from discriminating against nonresidents.' 9 The
clause, however, does not completely bar dissimilar treatment of resi-
dents and nonresidents. 20
In 1823, in Cor-ield v. Coryell,21 the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania rendered the first salient judicial interpretation
of the privileges and immunities clause. In Corqjeld, the court upheld a
New Jersey statute that limited the right to rake for oysters in New
Jersey waters to New Jersey residents 22 against a claim that the statute
violated the privileges and immunities clause.23 Justice Bushrod Wash-
ington, sitting as a Circuit Judge, reasoned that the language of the
clause encompassed a broad range of fundamental rights.24 Because he
IV of the Articles of Confederation to define the constitutional privileges and immunities clause in
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1898). Almost two hundred years after the ratification of
the Constitution, Chief Justice Burger recognized that "all the privileges of trade and commerce"
protected by the Articles of Confederation language are also protected by the privileges and im-
munities clause. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 394 (1978) (Burger,
CJ., concurring). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79-81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (tracing the historical developments of the privileges and immunities clause back to its origin
in the Articles of Confederation).
Under the Articles of Confederation, the privileges and immunities clause and the commerce
clause were joined in article IV in an attempt to preclude economic balkanization by the newly
formed states. Even though the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause are no
longer in the same article in the Constitution, many courts and commentators argue that the two
clauses still have overlapping objectives. See Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48
N.Y.2d 266, 270 n.7, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 n.7, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 n.7; see also Varat, State
"Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Cut. L. REv. 487, 518-19 (1981); Special Project,
supra, at 765.
18. See supra note 4.
19. "The primary purpose of this clause .. was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of
independent, sovereign States. It was designed to insure a citizen of State A who ventures into
State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395 (1948). See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294-95 (1920) (The purpose of article IV
is to create a single economic common market).
20. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) ("The privileges and immunities clause is not
absolute").
21. 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
22. Id at 548. Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen, violated the statute by removing oysters from
a New Jersey bay. Id
23. Id at 552. The court held that the statute justifiably protected New Jersey's natural re-
sources. Id
24. Id at 551-52. Justice Washington included the following rights on his list:
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of
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found the privileges and immunities secured under the clause to be
fundamental, Justice Washington concluded that these rights belong to
all citizens of free societies.25
For the next forty-five years, courts acknowledged Justice Washing-
ton's constitutional orthodoxy,26 without strictly adhering to his ap-
proach.27 In 1868, the Supreme Court explicitly interpreted the
privileges and immunities clause as an analogue to equal protection. In
Paul v. Virginia,28 the Supreme Court held that article IV, section 2
embodied general nondiscriminatory principles that required states to
grant nonresidents the same privileges given to residents.29 Paul's al-
the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of
the state; to take hold and dispose of property, either real or personal ....
Id at 552. Justice Washington did not believe, however, that raking for oysters was a part of a
citizen's fundamental rights. Justice Blackmun borrowed heavily from Justice Washington's list
in Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 384 (1978).
Because Justice Washington stated that all citizens have the right to "pass through, or to reside
in any other state, for purposes of. . . professional pursuits," it would be reasonable to infer that
the practice of law is a right protected by the privileges and immunities clause. Consequently,
under a Coqfield analysis, requirements such as residency for the bar would be unconstitutional.
Subsequent court opinions, however, soon made it evident that states had the exclusive power to
license lawyers. For instance, in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), the Supreme
Court stated:
[Tihe right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of
a state is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to the Federal
government, and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the
United States in the party seeking such license.
Id at 139. See Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978), vacated,
614 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980); Robinson's Case, 131 Mass. 376 (1881); Goodell's Case, 39 Wis. 232
(1875). But see .upra note 3 (inferior federal district courts have been far less deferential to the
states' right to license attorneys).
25. 6 F. Cas. at 551.
26. See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 591 (1855); Wiley v. Parner, 14 Ala. 627 (1848); Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299 (1866); Oliver
v. Washington Mills, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 268 (1865); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819);
Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 1 (1862); Kincaid v. Francis, 3 Tenn. (Cooke) 49 (1812). See generally
Antineau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
u/Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 1, 10-15 (1967).
27. See, e.g., Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); La Tourette v.
McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Redd v. St. Francis County, 17 Ark. 416 (1856); Haney v. Mar-
shall, 9 Md. 194 (1856); Austin v. State, 10 Mo. 591 (1847); Shipper v. Pennsylvania R.R., 47 Pa.
338 (1864).
28. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). Under the Paul interpretation, a court would invoke the
privileges and immunities clause only if an improper fit existed between the state's purpose and
means. Thus, the Court used a quasi-equal protection approach to eradicate discriminatory legis-
lation. See infra notes 30-31.
29. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180.
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tered interpretation30 of the privileges and immunities clause and the
growing influence of the fourteenth amendment3' caused the Court to
abandon temporarily the privileges and immunities clause.32
Recent Supreme Court decisions have resurrected the privileges and
immunities clause. In Toomer v. Wisell,33 the Court struck down a
South Carolina statute that imposed a $2,500 license tax on shrimp
boats owned by nonresidents while imposing only a $25 license tax on
similar boats owned by South Carolina residents.34 Chief Justice Vin-
son devised a reasonableness standard to assess asserted violations of
the privileges and immunities clause. First, a state must demonstrate
that it has a valid reason for making distinctions based on state citizen-
ship. Next, a state must show that the distinction bears a close relation-
ship 35 to that valid reason. Chief Justice Vinson noted that the state
30. Under the Corfield interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause, the fundamen-
tal rights protected by the clause were meant to be granted by national citizenship. Thus a right
secured under the privileges and immunities clause would be protected regardless of whether the
individual discriminated against was a resident or a nonresident of the state which impinged upon
the right.
Paul rejected this notion of rights that no state can transgress. The modem interpretation only
used the privileges and immunities clause to prevent discrimination against non-residents. As
Justice Rehnquist noted, dissenting in Zobel v. Willians, "[the privileges and immunities clause]
assures that nonresidents of a State shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as residents
enjoy ... We long ago held that the Clause has no application to a citizen of the State whose
laws are complained of." Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 84 n.3 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
31. Justice Blackmun wrote in Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371
(1978), that "[plerhaps because of the imposition of the Fourteenth Amendment upon our consti-
tutional consciousness and the extraordinary emphasis that the Amendment received, it is not
surprising that the contours of art. IV, section 2, cl. 1 are not well developed ... " 436 U.S. at
380.
32. The equal protection clause has generally taken over the protections of the privileges and
immunities clause. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); Tang v. Appellate Div. of N.Y. Supreme Court, First Dept., 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973),
cer. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974); Aronson v. Ambrose, 479 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
854 (1973); Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1974). See generally G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 374-79 (10th ed. 1980); J. NOWACK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 414 (2d ed. 1983).
33. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
34. Id at 388-91.
35. Id at 396. "Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether [reasons for
discrimination] do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them."
Id A court should also grant the states considerable leeway when analyzing local evils and pre-
scribing appropriate cures. Professor Varat argues that the Toomer analysis is comparable to the
intermediate scrutiny used in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and other gender-based cases.
Varat, supra note 17, at 514 n.109.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/7
Number 2] RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
justification was overinclusive.36 The Chief Justice then concluded that
the South Carolina statute "plainly and frankly" discriminates against
nonresidents. 37
In Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commission,38 the Court com-
bined the Toomer test with the fundamental interests concept devel-
oped in Co,-6eld and its progeny.39 Baldwin presented a challenge to a
Montana law requiring all nonresident hunters to purchase a hunting
license seven times more expensive than a resident's hunting license.4"
The Court refused to apply the Toomer "close" relation test41 because
the right to hunt for sport was not fundamental.42
In Hicklin v. Orbeck,43 the Supreme Court amplified the Toomer
standard.' The Hicklin Court first demanded that the state show that
nonresidents constitute a "peculiar source of evil" at which the statute
is aimed.45 The discrimination against nonresidents must then bear a
substantial relationship to the "evil" that nonresidents inflict on the
state.46 Using this test, the Court struck down an Alaska statute, aimed
36. 334 U.S. at 397.
37. Id at 396.
38. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
39. Id. at 387-88. See supra notes 20 and 24-29.
40. 436 U.S. at 373-74.
41. The Court described several new perspectives on the privileges and immunities analysis.
First, the Court asked whether the activity is so "basic and essential" that "interference with [it]
would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union .. " Id at 387. Next, the Court
asked whether the activity is "basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union." Id at 388.
The Court held that elk hunting was neither important to the formation of the nation nor basic to
the well-being of the Union. Thus the statute withstood the constitutional attack.
42. Id at 386-88. The Court concluded that elk hunting was nothing more than a recreation
and a sport for the wealthy. As such, the activity did not impinge upon one's right to obtain his or
her livelihood and therefore was not worthy of being deemed a fundamental right. Id at 388.
43. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
44. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. The Court in Hicklin ignored the Baldwin
Court's mention of fundamental rights. It is unclear whether the Court was purposefully attempt-
ing to move away from a fundamental rights analysis in privileges and immunities cases. Justice
Brennan, after writing a searing dissent to the Court's reliance on fundamental rights in Baldwin,
wrote the majority opinion in Hicklin, which may indicate that the Court is abandoning a Bald-
win-type analysis.
Regardless of the Supreme Court's intentions about the fundamental rights analysis in privi-
leges and immunities cases, subsequent lower court decisions have fused the Baldwin and Hicklin
tests to form a new hybrid analysis. See infra note 59.
45. 437 U.S. at 525.
46. Id. at 527-28. With Hicklin, the privileges and immunities clause appears to have ma-
tured as a means to deter state economic barriers. Gone are the "reasonable" or "close" relation-
ship analyses used in previous Court decisions. Rather, the Court has decided to use the
"substantial" relationship standard. In Hicklin, Justice Brennan appeared to care little for the
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at nonresidents working on the Alaskan pipeline, requiring employers
to give Alaska residents preferential treatment.47 Justice Brennan,
writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that the discriminatory ef-
fects of the statute did not bear a substantial relationship to the particu-
lar evil that the nonresidents allegedly presented.48
After Hicklin, several lower courts combined the new privileges and
immunities framework with an increased perception of the integration
of the legal practice into commercial activity49 to invalidate residency
requirements for admission to the bar.5 0 In Gordon v. Committee on
Character & Fitness,5 the New York Court of Appeals rejected a dura-
tional residency 52 rule that required a bar applicant to be a resident of
New York for six months.13 The court first noted that the practice of
law is a species of commercial activity5 4 and therefore within the pur-
"due regard" afforded to the state. He argued that even if the state carried its burden of proof that
nonresidents constitute a "peculiar source of evil," the statute may still be unconstitutional if less
restrictive alternatives exist. Id. at 528. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57,
84-85 (1978) (Court creates a more stringent equal privileges test). One indication that Hicklin is
the watershed point for the privileges and immunities clause is the number of courts that have
used the Hicklin analysis to strike down residency requirements. See supra note 3.
47. The Court found that neither the high unemployment rate among Alaskans nor Alaska's
interest in controlling oil extracted by the employers justified the statute. 437 U.S. at 527-28.
48. Id at 533-34.
49. Supreme Court decisions dealing with the commercial nature of the legal profession
ushered in a new judicial attitude toward the legal profession. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1977); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1977); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
371-72 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 (1975).
50. See supra note 3.
51. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
52. See supra note 5.
53. 48 N.Y.2d at 267, 397 N.E.2d at 1310, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
54. The Gordon court argued that the act of an attorney pursuing the practice of law is analo-
gous to oil workers employed on the Alaskan pipeline in Hickl/in in that both plaintiffs are pursu-
ing their employment opportunities. Id at 271, 397 N.E.2d at 1312, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 644. Indeed,
the primary triggering mechanism for a privileges and immunities claim has been the denial to a
nonresident of equal access to employment in a state. E.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978)
(statute giving qualified Alaska residents an absolute preference over nonresidents in the oil and
gas industry violated the privileges and immunities clause); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415
(1952) (licensing fee that was ten times higher for nonresident commercial fishermen than for
resident commercial fishermen violated the privileges and immunities clause); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948) (license fee of $25 for each commercial shrimp boat owned by a resident and
$2,500 for each boat owned by a nonresident violated the privileges and immunities clause);
Chalker v. Birmingham & Nw. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919) (tax on railroad construction work that
was four times greater for nonresidents than for residents discriminated against citizens of other
states); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871) (statute prohibiting nonresidents from
selling goods within the state violated the privileges and immunities clause). See supra note 17.
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view of the Hicklin test.5 It then applied this test and determined that
a state may not premise a nonresident's right to engage in his chosen
profession on state residency alone. 6
Three years later in Stalland v. South Dakota Board of Bar Examin-
ers,57 the District Court of South Dakota invalidated simple resi-
dency5" requirements for admission to the South Dakota bar. The
court held that the practice of law in South Dakota is a fundamental
right59 protected under the privileges and immunities clause.60 It ap-
plied the Hicklin test to determine if the discrimination was justified.
The court concluded that the nonresidents did not constitute a "pecu-
liar source of evil," and that the statute in question failed to bear a
substantial relationship to the particular evils nonresidents posed to the
state bar.61
In Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire,62 the First Circuit be-
came the first federal court of appeals to make a post-Hicklin examina-
tion of the privileges and immunities clause's application to residency
requirements for admission to a state bar. Judge Bownes, writing for
the equally-divided court,63 noted that the Supreme Court often has
used the privileges and immunities clause to invalidate state laws which
create economic opportunities favoring residents over nonresidents.64
Judge Bownes admitted that a state could discriminate on the basis of
55. 48 N.Y.2d at 272, 397 N.E.2d at 1312, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
56. Id at 273-74, 397 N.E.2d at 1313-14, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645-46.
57. 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982).
58. See supra note 5.
59. By including the determination of whether a particular activity is a fundamental right,
the court appears to have altered subtly the Hicklin test. Hicklin failed to discuss the fundamental
rights analysis. See supra note 44. Lower courts frequently combine the Baldwin analysis and the
Hicklin analysis into one test. See, e.g., Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Examiners, 530 F. Supp.
155, 158 (D.S.D. 1982); Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173, 177 (N.D. Ala. 1982);
Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n., 620 P.2d 640, 642-43 (Alaska 1980).
60. 530 F. Supp. at 158.
61. Id at 159-62. The Board of Bar Examiners argued that out-of-state attorneys constituted
a peculiar source of evil because they are unfamiliar with local customs, attitudes, laws, and pro-
cedures. Id at 159. The Board also noted that nonresident attorneys would not be subject to the
direct control or supervision of local courts. Id at 160. The court rejected these arguments, not-
ing that because an attorney, once admitted to the state bar, may immediately move out of the
state and yet retain his South Dakota license, a substantial relationship did not exist between the
alleged evil and the statutory means of preventing that evil.
62. 723 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc),prob. juris noted, 104 S. Ct. 2149 (1984).
63. Judge Coffin joined with Judge Bownes. Judge Breyer joined with Chief Judge
Campbell.
64. Id at 112-13.
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residency 65 when confronted with substantial sovereignty concerns. 6
He found, however, that the practice of law did not affect the sovereign
authority67 of the state in this case.68
Judge Bownes then applied the Hicklin substantial relationship anal-
ysis69 and concluded that New Hampshire residency requirements vio-
lated the privileges and immunities clause.7° He found that existing
procedural safeguards7 and bar examination methods72 sufficiently in-
65. Id at 114.
66. Judge Bownes recognized that some state activities are impregnable to national pressures.
Id These "political rights" present a distinction that courts developed early in the history of the
privileges and immunities clause to insure that some activities would be exempt from privileges
and immunities review. The rationale for this exception is that each state retained certain residual
sovereign power after the ratification of the Constitution. For instance, it offends the basic con-
cept of state sovereignty to allow a voter to cast a vote in elections in several states. See Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). It also would offend state sovereignty if a politician ran for office
in a state in which the candidate did not reside. See Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211
(D.N.H. 1973), a f'dmem, 414 U.S. 802 (1973). One commentator has suggested that the practice
of law is such a political right. See C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 715 (1969). But
see infra notes 67-68.
67. 723 F.2d at 114-15. Judge Bownes cited Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), to
define the parameters of the political rights exception. 723 F.2d at 114. Sugarman stated that the
parameters of political rights encompassed the qualification of voters; individuals holding impor-
tant elective or non-elective positions in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches; or perform
any function that goes to the essence of representative government. 413 U.S. at 647. Bownes then
cited In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), to demonstrate that attorneys fall outside the exception
and therefore are not subject to residency requirements. 723 F.2d at 114-15. See In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. at 729 (Attorneys do not fall within parameters of political occupations because the
"practice of law [does not] place one so close to the core of the political process as to make him a
formulator of government policy.")
68. 723 F.2d at 115. Judge Bownes' approach to whether the practice of law is a "political
right" is logical. Permitting an attorney to practice his trade in more than one state does not
offend basic notions of federalism. Attorneys often practice concurrently in more than one state.
Multi-state practices are not offensive because the attorney's relationship with the state is far too
attenuated to affect the identity of the state and because attorneys are not at the core of the
political process. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 729. Thus Judge Bownes correctly stated that no justifi-
cation exists for exempting the legal profession from privileges and immunities scrutiny.
69. 723 F.2d at 115-16. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
70. 723 F.2d at 115-18.
71. Id at 116. Judge Bownes argued that nonresident attorneys were no more a source of
evil to the state judicial system than local attorneys. Id For instance, nonresident attorneys could
be reached just as easily as their resident counterparts for court or disciplinary proceedings. Id
Also, the state could easily gain jurisdiction over the attorney through the state's long-arm statute.
Id Many of the nonresident attorneys live just as close, if not closer, to the New Hampshire
courts than attorneys residing in outlying areas of the state. Id
Although Judge Bownes spoke only to the use of long-arm statutes, a state bar could also de-
mand that the nonresident lawyer have an office in the state where he will practice or designate the
clerk of the court as an agent for service of process. The Minnesota and North Dakota bars
presently employ such a system. See supra note 9. Whether by way of a long-arm statute or by
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/7
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sured that nonresidents would constitute no greater evil than their resi-
dent counterparts. 3 He further reasoned that the discriminatory rule
bore no substantial relationship to the evils asserted by the state74 be-
cause the rule did not require a lawyer to remain a New Hampshire
resident any longer than the day he or she was admitted to the bar.75
Even if the residency requirement had passed the "peculiar evil" test,
the rule would still be unconstitutional, according to Judge Bownes,
because the state could have used a less restrictive means to achieve its
ends.76
In dissent, Chief Judge Campbell first noted that the lead opinion's
consideration of the state's right to establish its own bar standards
failed to give sufficient weight to principles of federalism.77 Chief
Judge Campbell also stated that the court too liberally applied the
Hicklin test.78 According to Chief Judge Campbell, a court confronted
the designation of the clerk of the court, clearly court and disciplinary proceedings against nonres-
idents are no more burdensome than those against residents. See Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of
Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982); Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173
(N.D. Ala. 1981).
72. 723 F.2d at 116. Judge Bownes rejected the defendant's argument that nonresident attor-
neys would pose a threat to the state bar because they would be ignorant of local practice and
rules. Id Judge Bownes reasoned that all attorneys, regardless of residence, would study the
same material and pass the same examination before they could practice. Id Thus, neither resi-
dent nor nonresident attorneys could pose a greater threat to the state legal system because all will
have satisfied the state's required minimum standards. Id
73. Id Judge Bownes argued that the lack of incentive to develop a good reputation is unre-
lated to a lawyer's state of residence. Id As the district court stated: "[D]eveloping a good
reputation is a function of the 'heart,' not the home." 539 F. Supp. at 1072.
74. Because Judge Bownes' analysis failed to find that nonresidents constitute a "peculiar
source of evil," his inquiry could have ended. 723 F.2d at 116. Judge Bownes, however, investi-
gated the second part of the Hicklin analysis.
75. 723 F.2d at 117.
76. Id Judge Bownes listed several ways in which the New Hampshire bar could easily
achieve its goals with less onerous alternatives. These alternatives included continuing educa-
tional requirements, standards of courtroom decorum and professional conduct, requirements that
nonresidents maintain an office or affiate themselves with lawyers within the state, case-by-case
competency examinations, and sanctions for unprofessional conduct. .d
77. _d at 118.
78. Chief Judge Campbell argued that Hicklin required that a state need only show that there
was a "substantial reason" for the discrimination and only a "reasonable relationship" between
the selected means and the desired end. Id
Chief Judge Campbell's interpretation of the Hicklin test is not unfounded. The Supreme
Court stated in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), that the means only need be reasonably
related to a substantial state end. Id at 399. Initially, Justice Brennan repeated this reasonable
relation standard in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978).
There are numerous problems with Chief Judge Campbell's interpretation of the Hicklin-
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with a privileges and immunities challenge always must grant a state
broad discretion in its actions. 79 Thus, a proper privileges and immuni-
ties analysis demands only a showing of reasonableness by the state.80
Chief Judge Campbell believed that the New Hampshire Supreme
Toomer standard, however. Chief Judge Campbell completely disregarded language in Toomer
that demands that state discrimination must have a "close relation" to a "substantial" state inter-
est. 334 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added). Chief Judge Campbell also neglected important language
in Hick/in which states that the state's selected means must pass a "substantially related" test. 437
U.S. at 527. Justice Brennan also stated in Hicklin that the means must be "closely tailored" to
the end. Id at 528. By invoking the least restrictive alternative test, Justice Brennan demon-
strated that the Court would hold a state to a much higher standard than a mere reasonable
relation test. For a discussion on the least restrictive alternative analysis, see Wormuth and
Mirkin, The Doctrine ofthe Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964); Note, The Less
Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Analysis, .4 Justfcation, and Some Crite-
ria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971 (1974). That the Hicklin Court struck down an Alaska statute that
appeared on its face to be a reasonable means to cure the state's chronically high unemployment
further suggests that the Hicklin analysis requires more than a reasonable relation between the
statute and the perceived danger. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Thus, by invalidat-
ing a facially reasonable statute, the Hicklin Court invoked a substantial relationship test in privi-
leges and immunities cases.
Since Hicklin, the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to elaborate upon its privileges
and immunities analyses. In Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), however, Justice O'Connor
restated the two-part test: "First, there must be 'something to indicate that non-citizens constitute
a peculiar source of evil at which the statute is aimed.' Second, the Court must find a 'substantial
relationship' between the evil and the discrimination practiced against citizens." Id at 76
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-27 (1978)). Federal
district courts subsequently have employed the substantial relation test. See, e.g., Galahad v.
Weinshienk, 555 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Colo. 1983); Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners,
530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982); Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Ala. 1981);
Noll v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 649 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1980); Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Exam.
iners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (W.Va. 1982).
Legal scholars also have interpreted the Toomer-Hicklin test to be a substantial relationship test.
See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASEs AND MATERIALS IN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 379 (10th ed. 1980); J.
NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 304 (2d ed. 1983); Special Project,
Admission to the Bar: A ContitutionalAnalysis, 34 VAND. L. REv. 655, 770, 774 (1981); Note, A
Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and
Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1461, 1479-81 (1979).
79. 723 F.2d at 118.
80. Id But see supra notes 46 & 78. Chief Judge Campbell further supported his position by
analogizing state bar residency requirements to applications for lawyers to appearpro hac vice.
723 F.2d at 121. Chief Judge Campbell cited Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (per curiam), apro
hac vice case, for the proposition that states should be given much discretion in the regulation of
the practice of law by nonresident lawyers. 723 F.2d at 121. He believed that thepro hac vice
cases demonstrate a disinclination on the part of federal courts to review stringently the manner in
which a state regulates its bar. Id
Judge Bownes rejected this analogy in his opinion and posited two reasons why thepro hac vice
standard should not apply in the privileges and immunities context. Id at 115 n.5. First, thepro
hac vice cases dealt with procedural due process, not privileges and immunities. Id Second,pro
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Court reasonably could have concluded 8 1 that the admission of nonres-
ident attorneys to the bar would harm the state's court system 82 because
of attorneys' status as officers of the court.8 3 In addition, Chief Judge
Campbell asserted that a federal court should not substitute its judg-
ment about bar requirements for that of the state's supreme court.8 4
The First Circuit reached a logical and well-supported 8  result in
hac Yice cases analyzed the distinction between the members of a state bar and nonmembers-not
between resident applicants for the state bar and nonresident applicants. Id
Bownes neglected another major distinction between pro hac vice cases and residency require-
ment cases. If a state refuses to grant a pro hac vice case, it is only a temporary impediment to an
attorney's ability to practice in that state. A state's discretion in residency requirement cases, on
the other hand, permanently impedes the lawyer's ability to practice law. Thus the latter position
should be subject to a higher standard of review. Compare Rossario v. Rockerfeller, 410 U.S. 752
(1973) (anti-raiding laws are permissible because they only temporarily preclude a person from
exercising his right to vote) with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one year residency
requirement is too great an impediment to an individual's right to vote).
81. Chief Judge Campbell acknowledged that Hicklin requires that a state must provide a
"substantial reason" for discriminating against nonresidents. 723 F.2d at 120. He misinterpreted
the language of Hicklin, however, and suggested that Hicklin requires only a lower-level, deferen-
tial standard of review. Id at 120-21. The Chief Judge illogically reasoned that because New
Hampshire demonstrated that its reasons for discriminating against nonresidents were not insub-
stantial, the state provided the requisite "substantial reason" for favoring residents over nonresi-
dents, Id at 121-22. Chief Judge Campbell never showed that New Hampshire's reasons for
discrimination were substantial; rather, he only showed that the state's concerns were reasonable.
82. Chief Judge Campbell feared that the dilution of bar residency requirements could lead
to the situation where large, out-of-state firms would attract business away from local attorneys.
Id at 119. He believed that this usurpation of legal work by out-of-state attorneys would under-
mine the quality and extent of legal services available to state residents. Id at 119-20. Chief
Judge Campbell also feared that the nonresident attorney's ignorance with local "nuance and
custom" would subtly alter New Hampshire law into a composite of the laws of the other states.
Id at 120.
83. Id Chief Judge Campbell referred to attorneys as "officers of the court." Id The Ameri-
can Bar Association has stated that the term is "at best meaningless, and at worst misleading."
AMERICAN LAwYER's CODE OF CONDUCT Preamble (Discussion Draft 1980), reprinted in 16
TRIAL 44, 49 (Aug. 1980). One commentator has stated that the phrase "is at best an imprecise
categorization which cannot be accorded any constitutional significance." Note, supra note 17 at
1478. The phrase, however, is useful. The legal profession is unique among professions in
America today. An attorney is the only professional a court can command to perform services for
a specific client for little or no compensation. The only possible explanation for the court's ability
to single out and demand pro bono work from lawyers is that the attorney plays an integral role in
the state function of administering justice by acting as a conduit into our legal system. Thus the
term "officer of the court" serves as shorthand for a means of access to the legal system. This role
of the attorney, however, is not enough to grant states the power to set residency standards for the
legal profession via the "political rights" exemption from privileges and immunities scrutiny. See
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
84. 723 F.2d at 120-22.
85. Judge Bownes' interpretation of the Hicklin test is well-founded. See supra notes 44-48
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Piper v. Supreme Court ofNew Hampshfre. 6 The privileges and immu-
nities clause is a valuable vehicle for nonresidents to use to gain access
to another state's job market. 7 Article IV also provides greater access
to the legal system. Although Judge Bownes does not refer to the client
in his analysis, it is apparent that the layman also profits from the in-
validation of residency requirements. The relaxation or repudiation of
residency requirements permits a greater number of qualified attorneys
to practice in a given state, resulting in greater access to the legal sys-
tem. Chief Judge Campbell's concern that out-of-state law firms might
attract business from local practitioners is irrelevant, since the client
will be merely exercising his right to choose among the best legal serv-
ices available.88 With the advent of more accessible attorneys, compe-
tition between the firms may decrease legal fees and thus enable lower
income groups to obtain legal services. Residency requirements need-
lessly restrict the options available to the layman who seeks access to
this system.89 Finally, modern legal practice increasingly has tran-
scended state boundaries9" further demonstrating the obsolescence of
and accompanying text. His analysis is supported by other courts and legal commentators. See
supra note 78.
86. 723 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc),prob.juris. noted, 104 S. Ct. 2149 (1984).
87. The privileges and immunities clause guarantees that a citizen of State A has the right to
pursue his or her occupation in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of State
B. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 384, 396 (1948); see supra note 19. Of course, a state should be
allowed to set minimum standards of competency and morality for attorneys practicing within its
borders. This can easily be justified under the police power as protecting the citizens of the state
from fraud and incompetence. See supra note 54.
88. See supra note 82. The repudiation of bar residency requirements is desirable because
the legal community's main concern should lie with the quality of services available. See infra
notes 89 & 92.
89. One of the highest goals of any democratic society must be to achieve and maintain
equality before the law. Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility charges each lawyer
with the duty to assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available to
as many individuals as possible. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2
(1979). Also, Canon 8 of the Code seeks an attorney's assistance in improving the legal system.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 8 (1979). Both of these canons indicate
that the legal profession is not only aware of its important role in maintaining equality before the
law but also is working affirmatively to obtain that goal. Recent Supreme Court decisions envi-
sion an enhanced role for the attorney in providing access to the legal system. See Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (a rule permitting commercial advertising of services and
prices is in accord with the bar's obligation to assist in making legal services fully available);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (part of Court's concern in overruling a county
bar association's fee schedule was that the fixed, rigid price floor for minimum fees effectively
precluded some laymen from gaining the services of an attorney). See supra note 49.
90. The rise of multistate litigation, liberalized reciprocity agreements, and law firms with
offices in more than one state have blurred state lines for the legal profession. Special Project,
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state residency requirements.9" Thus, these requirements foster eco-
nomic protectionism and parochial interests92 and ignore the needs of
both the attorney and the client. The court in Piper correctly held these
requirements unconstitutional. As the first federal court of appeals to
consider the validity of residency requirements under the privileges
and immunities clause, Piper should serve as significant precedent for
other courts to follow.
JK.P.
supra note 17 at 768. But see Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983) (reciprocity
arrangements do not violate article IV, section 2).
91. Even if nonresident attorneys do constitute a "peculiar source of evil," the New Hamp-
shire Board of Bar Examiners could easily achieve its goals with less onerous requirements. See
supra note 46. For example, the Board could increase the number or the difficulty of the questions
on the bar exam concerning local procedural and substantive law. These additional requirements
would assure that all lawyers possess a substantive knowledge of state procedural and substantive
law and rules. If an attorney does not practice in New Hampshire for a predetermined amount of
time, the Board could require that the lawyer take a minimum competency test to insure that he is
still familiar with the state's rules. The Board also may discipline out-of-state attorneys in the
same manner it may discipline resident attorneys.
92. Courts and commentators increasingly view state bar residency requirements as a bastion
of archaic economic protectionism. See Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640, 646 (Alaska
1980); Dalton & Williamson, State Barriers Against Migrant Lawyers, 25 UMKC L. REv. 144,
147-48 (1957); Howell, Does Judge Advocate Service Qualifyfor Admission on Motion 53 A.B.A.J.
915, 915 (1967); Smith, Timefor a National Practice of Law Act, 64 A.B.A.J. 557, 557 (1978).
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